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Abstract. The rapidly increasing interest of foreign investors in land in the global South, also termed land
grabbing, has been widely discussed as potentially supportive, but often rather harmful for local populations.
Combining a critical livelihoods perspective with access theory and a bargaining model, this study scrutinizes
local people’s perceptions of the land investments, power relations during land negotiations and intra-community
differences. By analysing two European forestry companies in Tanzania, we have chosen a sector and a country
with presumably more positive outcomes for local populations. The deals resulted in not only labour opportu-
nities and infrastructural improvements, which are mainly perceived as positive, but also cases of violated land
rights, inadequate compensation and decreased food security. Hence, even under favourable preconditions, the
consequences for local people are ambivalent. With this study, we contribute to a differentiated analysis of the
contested role of large-scale land deals in contemporary rural development.
1 Introduction
The rapidly increasing interest of foreign investors in land
in the global South is a prominent phenomenon of new rural
dynamics, often termed global land rush or land grabbing.
Large-scale land acquisitions, mostly in the form of long-
term leases of land, aim mainly at food and biofuels produc-
tion for export as well as at speculation. They are related to
drivers such as the financial and food markets and climate
policies (Peters, 2013). Transnational land acquisitions have
been widely discussed as potentially supportive, but often
rather harmful for local populations, particularly smallhold-
ers. Concerns include violated land rights and lack of access
to land-based natural resources for local people, resulting in
decreased food security and ultimately the replacement of
smallholders by badly paid labourers and unemployed land-
less poor (Cotula et al., 2009; de Schutter, 2011; Li, 2011).
Yet, land deals should be portrayed neither as simply “pro-
viding much-needed capital and technology for third world
agricultural production, food security and employment” nor
as “neo-colonial scrambles for land and resources conducted
by predatory investors at the expense of marginal popula-
tions abroad” (Wolford et al., 2013:191–192). Instead, more
in-depth case studies are needed that provide a nuanced anal-
ysis of the interaction of the involved stakeholders and bring
in local views (Smalley and Corbera, 2012; Edelman et al.,
2013).
This article aims to contribute to this debate with insights
from two case studies of forestry projects in Tanzania. We
argue that it is particularly crucial to look at how land deals
are negotiated. Power relations between investors and local
people are usually unbalanced in favour of investors (Bor-
ras Jr. and Franco, 2012:54). However, there are also cases
where local people have considerably influenced investment
projects (Smalley and Corbera, 2012). By employing ac-
cess theory and a bargaining perspective, we contribute to a
more specific understanding of the balance of powers in the
negotiation process. Further, we present the local people’s
views, and consider their heterogeneity in the power analysis.
Hence, we address the observation of Evers et al. (2013:4)
that “. . . the sentiments of the ‘local population’ are hardly
homogeneous and often absent from the debates”.
We have chosen the case studies deliberately with the aim
of analysing large-scale land acquisitions with potentially
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positive consequences. By looking at these cases we add to a
more complete picture of the global land rush. While much
of the literature on the land rush examined land deals related
to food or biofuels production, less attention has been paid to
forestry plantations. This is despite the fact that large-scale
forestry plantations make up a substantial share of the global
land rush and predictions that the demand for land for in-
dustrial forestry is likely to increase considerably in the next
two decades (Lambin and Meyfroidt, 2011; Kröger, 2012).
Forestry plantations are not only profitable due to their wood
products but also as providers of carbon sequestration cer-
tificates that can be sold on the global market of greenhouse
gas emission reductions. They are long-term, highly vulner-
able investments, prone to fires and illegal harvesting. There-
fore, we argue that forestry companies depend to a greater
extent on the acceptance of the local population than other
companies. Representatives of the examined companies em-
phasized that applying corporate social responsibility is a
worthwhile strategy. This might be even more relevant for
investors, such as the ones examined, who want to engage in
the trade of emission certificates and need to observe inter-
national social and environmental standards.
Tanzania was chosen as case study country owing to its
relatively abundant land availability (Deininger, 2011) and its
laws recognising customary land rights (Alden Wily, 2012).
While both analysed cases focus on forestry plantations in
Tanzania, they differ in terms of local land availability, type
of acquired land (individual or communal land holding) and
offered compensation (in cash or in kind).
In the following, we first give a brief clarification of the
conceptual and empirical approaches used in the study. Af-
ter explaining the political and legal context of transnational
land deals in Tanzania, we present the analysis of our case
studies. The article closes with a discussion of the find-
ings and concluding remarks regarding the land rush phe-
nomenon.
2 Conceptual and empirical approaches
As an overall approach, we engage with a critical livelihoods
perspective (Scoones, 2009; Geiser et al., 2011; de Haan,
2012), focusing on daily practices and experiences of poor
people. With this, we bring in the perspective of those most
affected by land deals. To unravel the powers that shape the
land deal decisions, we combine access theory with a classi-
cal bargaining power perspective. The access theory of Ribot
and Peluso (2003) helps one to understand how people gain,
maintain and control access to certain natural resources. Ac-
cess, “the ability to benefit from things” (Ribot and Peluso,
2003:153), is constituted by a bundle of strands of powers,
also termed access mechanisms, that people or organizations
hold or can draw upon. The presented power strands refer to
both rights based and other structural and relational means
of access, such as social identity (gender, ethnicity, etc.; see
ibid., 170–171), and are often intertwined. The access theory
helps us to analyse a broad range of factors that shape ac-
cess and to understand why certain people are not included
in decision-making. For the analysis of concrete negotiations
of the land deals, we use elements of the bargaining power
model developed by Yan and Grey (1994) based on classical
bargaining and resource dependence perspectives (see also
Inkpen and Beamish, 1997). The model looks at the rela-
tive bargaining power of parties in relationships formed on
a voluntary basis. While it was developed to analyse inter-
national joint ventures (which is technically speaking not the
case here), we argue it can nonetheless be applied in our case
studies based on the long-term collaboration or at least ac-
ceptance that is needed between forestry companies and lo-
cal people. The model distinguishes context-based elements
of bargaining power such as the involved bargainers’ alterna-
tives to the deal, and resource-based components, e.g. land,
money or labour, committed by the parties to the cooperative
relationship. Bargainers committing crucial resources that
are difficult for the other party to replace have high power
in the negotiations, as they can use them as leverage. Thus,
the bargaining perspective is useful in understanding the rel-
evance of different elements of power in concrete bargaining
situations.
The analysis is based on more than 150 qualitative inter-
views, mainly with local people from different backgrounds,
and with key persons and state officials from the local, dis-
trict, regional and national level. Group discussions were
conducted with groups of men and women in three villages
in each case study site. Several meetings were also held with
staff of the company in case study B, while in case study A
the contact to the company was limited to a few initial meet-
ings and later refused. Fieldwork took place during 2010,
2011 and 2013.
3 Transnational land deals in Tanzania: political and
legal context
Like many other developing countries in recent years, Tanza-
nia has attracted a number of foreign investors interested in
land. Tanzania has reportedly leased out an area of around
200 000 to 1 000 000 hectares. While numerous investors
headed for biofuel projects, many of these projects have
been abandoned, mainly due to financial constraints. The fo-
cus of the more recent investment endeavours lies rather on
food production. Further, there are few forestry projects of
transnational companies, of which two have been chosen for
this study (Sulle and Nelson, 2009; Locher and Sulle, 2013;
Land Matrix, 2014).
The Tanzanian government has followed a policy of at-
tracting foreign investors as part of its strategy for economic
growth for around three decades and established the Tanza-
nia Investment Centre (TIC) to encourage and facilitate for-
eign investments. National government officials (interviewed
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by Locher, 2010, 2011) argued that the rural areas in Tanza-
nia could benefit from such investments in terms of labour
opportunities, improved agricultural technologies and infras-
tructure. However, due to numerous land disputes, public
pressure and deflating experiences with failing projects, in
2010 the government published guidelines which regulate
and limit biofuel projects, and reportedly is in the process
of establishing ceilings which would limit the size of future
land deals for any agricultural purpose (Hultman et al., 2012;
Kiishweko, 2012).
Tanzanian land law, regulated mainly by the Land Act
and the Village Land Act of 1999, is relatively progressive
in terms of respecting customary land rights (Alden Wily,
2012). Land in rural areas usually falls in the category of
village land and is administered by the village council, on
behalf of the village assembly, applying existing customary
law. This is recognized by the state whether it is in written
form or not. Village land may include land plots, which are
given to individuals or households for permanent use and
may also be inherited or sold (de facto ownership1) as well
as common land to which all villagers have access to (e.g.
forests), and barren land, which is considered as land reserve
for future generations (URT, 1999a, b). Though the land acts
have been enacted in 2001, they are still not enforced and
practised everywhere (Pedersen, 2010) and the procedures
regarding land deals are implemented only partially (Ver-
meulen and Cotula, 2010).
The current procedure for land acquisition is lengthy and
onerous. Foreign investors cannot lease village land directly.
Land deals are only possible if the land is transferred to
the category general land, which is under the jurisdiction
of the Ministry of Lands and Human Settlements Develop-
ment (in short: Ministry of Lands). This process requires the
village assembly’s agreement2, documented by meeting min-
utes. Further, the involved parties have to agree on the com-
pensation. Compensation should be based on market value,
estimated by a government expert, and should be paid for
land and unexhausted improvements, such as crops or trees.
Finally, after several steps, the Ministry of Lands on behalf
of the President enacts the land transfer.
1Despite the villagers’ possibility to have de facto ownership of
land, in the following, we use the term landholders, to accommo-
date the fact that legally, all land in Tanzania is public land vested
in the president, who owns it on behalf of the whole nation (URT,
1999a).
2To be precise, for the transfer of areas larger than 250 hectares,
the village assembly only gives a recommendation to the president,
who makes the final decision; however, in the cases known to us this
recommendation was never ignored in a way that an area larger than
that agreed on by the village assembly would have been transferred.
In some cases the opposite happened: the District Land Allocation
Committee decreased the area to be transferred because it felt that
otherwise the villagers would not have enough land left for their
own (future) use.
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Figure 1. Map of Tanzania displaying the case study areas. A: New
Forests Company (NFC) in Kilolo district, B: Tanga Forests Ltd
(TF) in Pangani district.
4 Findings from the two case studies in Tanzania
4.1 The two investors and their forestry projects
4.1.1 Case study A: the project of the New Forests
Company in Kilolo district
Kilolo is a hilly district in the Iringa region, in the South-
ern Highlands of Tanzania (cf. Fig. 1). It has favourable con-
ditions for the permanent cultivation of several food crops.
Many households also plant timber as savings, particularly
on their less fertile or steep plots of land.
In 2006, a Member of Parliament from Kilolo introduced
the New Forests Company (NFC) to his district. The UK-
based NFC presents itself as a sustainable forestry enter-
prise, with plantations producing wooden feed materials in
Uganda, Mozambique and Tanzania, and aiming to produce
carbon certificates (NFC, 2014). Representatives of the NFC
visited 12 villages to promote their investment. In some vil-
lages the company’s request for land was declined because of
a lack of land. Other villages welcomed the investor. By early
2013, the NFC had acquired 6300 hectares of land in seven
villages (Table 1). The transferred land had mainly belonged
to individual households. Some of the land had been per-
manently cultivated; other land lay fallow, mainly due to its
remoteness. Landholders were compensated with cash. Fur-
ther, the investor promised to support the local communities
with infrastructure improvements, distribution of seedlings,
and nursing training. In 2009, the company established a
tree nursery and its first plantations of pine and eucalyptus
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Table 1. Share of village land provided to the investor in the Kilolo district (case study A) (based on figures obtained from the Kilolo district
land officer in 2013).
Village Total area of the Area provided to NFC (ha) Share of village area
village (ha) provided to NFC
Magome 18 636 (one plot covering areas 2295 together 4.1 %
Kidabaga 35 007 of all three villages)
Idete 1873
Isele 8272 (one plot covering areas 3852 together 22.5 %
Kising’a 8885 of both villages)
Ukwega 8212 122 1.5 %
Ipalamwa 4275 63 1.5 %
Total 85 160 6332 7.4 %
(personal communication by Locher with district land officer
in 2013; Locher, 2011).
4.1.2 Case study B: the project of Tanga Forests in
Pangani district
Pangani district is located on the northern coast of Tanzania
(cf. Fig. 1). The local people practise small-scale subsistence
farming, fishing and livestock keeping. Large areas are cov-
ered by bush land, partly used by pastoralists for grazing and
by villagers for collecting firewood and grass that is used for
weaving mats and other products.
The Norwegian company, Green Resources SA (GRAS)
has been running large tree plantations in Iringa region since
the 1990s. It produces and sells carbon certificates on the vol-
untary market (GRAS, 2013). In 2005, it established Tanga
Forest Ltd (TF) as a subsidiary with the aim of expanding its
plantations to Pangani and other districts in Tanga region. In
2006, TF started acquiring an area of around 7500 hectares
in six villages in Pangani, mainly village reserve bush land.
TF did not pay any compensation in cash, but constructed
different infrastructural buildings in each village. It estab-
lished a nursery and teak and eucalyptus plantations. In July
2012, GRAS closed down its subsidiary TF. The reasons
given were the weak performance of the planted seedlings
due to unsuitable soil and changing weather conditions as
well as conflicts around land issues (personal communica-
tion by Locher with former Plantation Operations Manager
in 2013).
4.2 Local people’s perceptions of the land deals and their
consequences
The case studies show that local people did not consider for-
eign investors as intruders and new colonists (as might be
expected; see for example Via Campesina, 2012), but wel-
comed them, based on – at least partly justified – expecta-
tions of getting employment and highly needed infrastruc-
ture or other benefits as compensation for their land. In prin-
ciple, both types of compensation – in cash for individual
land (in Kilolo) and in kind for communal land (in Pangani)
– were appreciated. Individuals who received cash used it
for varying short-term to more sustainable purposes based
on their different livelihood assets and strategies. Many vil-
lagers were planning to use the money for their children’s
school fees. Others bought new land or invested in improved
housing. Some households spent the money on consumption
or health-related needs. Many people welcomed the compen-
sation in terms of new infrastructure, particularly in Pangani
(dispensary, village office, water tank, etc.) but also to a lim-
ited extent in Kilolo (maternity ward and school building im-
provement). They highlighted that the Tanzanian state did not
have enough funds for providing such facilities. Interviewees
further emphasized that there were no or not enough employ-
ment opportunities in their region and that “We have young
people, they need to get a job”. They therefore considered
private investments necessary.
There are three crucial preconditions that determine the
rather positive view of many local people. First, villagers
strongly expect the investors to follow the proper procedure,
to respect local land rights and provide the agreed compen-
sation in time. Asked whether they would prefer foreign or
domestic investors, interviewed villagers usually answered
that this did not matter: “Important is that the company does
the right thing, not the origin”. This reflects the local people’s
strong dependence on the enforcement of the land law during
the negotiations (discussed below).
Second, local people expect to continue their land based
livelihood strategies. Thus, whenever possible, they only pro-
vided land to the investors that was of no current and di-
rect use to them. Indeed, many people did not feel any di-
rect change to their land-based livelihoods. One interviewee
stated: “I cannot see anything bad. The land was not being
used”. However, there were cases in which villagers lost land
against their will or were forced to sell due to hardship situa-
tions, and some of them reported decreased food security as
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a consequence of their reduced or lost possibility to produce
food. A disappointed villager summarized these two crucial
issues as follows: “The investor would be no problem, if they
would follow the agreement. And if they would leave some
land for us.”
Third, local people wish to get additional labour opportu-
nities to diversify their livelihood strategies. Both companies
offered new income opportunities in the form of daily labour.
However, the work load and conditions were considered very
hard in case study A, and the salary low and often paid with
delay in case study B. Mainly members of the poorest house-
holds accepted these insecure labour options and perceived
them as a slight improvement for their livelihoods.
After having experienced tensions and conflicts related to
omitted land rights or delayed compensation payments (dis-
cussed below) or when being deflated by unfavourable labour
conditions, some affected people had a more nuanced percep-
tion or even turned against the companies, as the following
two statements illustrate: “They have taken my land. I don’t
want to have any relation with them.” “It is not a good deal,
because the investor gets more than the villagers.” However,
a considerable part of the population continued seeing at least
some benefits from the investments. Accordingly, many vil-
lagers were disappointed when TF closed down its activities.
4.3 Strands of power shaping the land deal processes
4.3.1 Tanzanian land law in the context of complex land
tenure situations
Tanzanian law concerning land transfer, giving considerable
decision power to the local population, has been followed in
most of the analysed cases. Depending on the situation, entire
villages and individuals participated in the decision-making
process. Some also took the decision not to give land. Hence,
in most of the cases the existent land rights were respected.
However, in some cases the local people have been ex-
cluded from the decision-making process. In other cases,
they have been involved, but under unfavourable conditions.
This happened particularly when complex land tenure situa-
tions prevailed. In Pangani, for example, one village had pro-
vided land to TF that belonged to two neighbouring villages.
The conflict was brought to the Ministry of Lands, whose
investigations confirmed the village boundaries, but only af-
ter the company had already established plantations on that
land. The affected two villages could not take any decision
in this regard, and had not received any compensation by
2012, when TF closed down. In another village in Kilolo,
where village reserve land was sold, it turned out that part
of the plot had been in use by people from the neighbouring
village, based on longstanding local agreements. When the
landholders realized that they had lost their land to the NFC,
they appealed to their local leaders to claim it back. After
around two years, the landholders were finally compensated,
but not given back their land (Locher, 2011). An affected in-
terviewee stated: “We don’t have enough freedom to use our
land rights”, thus referring to other power strands besides the
legal mechanism that shape the land deal processes.
4.3.2 Government authorities’ twofold influence in the
land deal process
Government authorities, be they politicians or civil servants,
often act as intermediaries between investors and local popu-
lations. They are generally highly respected among the vil-
lagers due to their educational level and expert positions
(cf. also Chachage and Baha, 2010). As Ribot and Peluso
(2003:169) state: “Expert status also carries authority that
may allow individuals to manipulate others’ beliefs or the
categories of resource access and use”. Hence, first, govern-
ment authorities play a key role in the decision-making for
the land deals. During the promotional tours in Kilolo, for ex-
ample, district leaders accompanied the company represen-
tatives. This entourage not only provided information about
the procedures for the land deals but also enhanced the ne-
gotiated project’s legitimacy and acceptance. A district land
officer summarized the way how they approached the village
assemblies as follows: “We told them: there is this company
that wants to acquire land and you people have to provide
your land”. In both case study areas, some politicians from
the local to the regional level played a double role. Investors
hired them as land deal promoters; this was not always trans-
parent to villagers. Being or having been well-known polit-
ical representatives, these consultants had considerable in-
fluence on the villagers’ decisions. A female interviewee in
Kilolo stated the following: “These investors always come
with district or regional leaders, they put pressure on us.”
Also in the above-presented case of conflicts around village
boundaries in Pangani, a local politician employed by the
company was involved.
Second, the influence of district officials and politicians is
also crucial in the implementation of the legal process, in-
cluding the clarification of complex land tenure situations
and the settlement of the compensation. In both case stud-
ies, the clarification of land rights was not sufficiently car-
ried out by the local leaders and district officials, leading
to the above-mentioned conflicts. For compensation payment
in Kilolo, the district valuer estimated the value of the land
to be an average price of TSh 100 000/acre in 2008 (around
EUR 135/hectare), which was paid during the first land trans-
fers. However, the NFC representatives went on further pro-
motional tours without district officers to request additional
land. With the help of their hired consultants, they convinced
a number of landowners to accept compensation clearly be-
low market value, namely TSh 25 000/acre. In Pangani, the
district officials made no estimation of the value of the land.
Hence, it remains open whether the negotiated compensation
was adequate or not.
In sum, by having highly respected politicians and some-
times also officers on their side, the investors benefit from
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their influence on local people’s decision-making and their
power to shape the implementation of the land deal process.
This illustrates that “Access to authority is an important junc-
ture in the web of powers” (Ribot and Peluso, 2003:170).
Investors often have better access to authorities than local
people, but access also differs among the local population.
4.3.3 Legitimizing discourses
The decision regarding land deals is influenced by the Tan-
zanian government’s policy of encouraging land-based in-
vestments as part of a rural development strategy. Ribot and
Peluso (2003:169) pointed out that “discourse and the abil-
ity to shape discursive terms deeply influence entire frame-
works of resource access”. By reproducing the national de-
velopment discourse, government authorities at all levels
provide legitimation for land deals. Investors draw upon
this discourse to support their corporate social responsibil-
ity rhetoric during the promotional tours. In order to con-
vince local people to provide land, both companies pro-
moted a long-term, development-oriented “partnership” be-
tween themselves and the local population. The minutes of
the general assemblies in several villages in Kilolo give some
hints about the message the participants must have taken
home from these promotional tours. They reveal a long list
with a number of “purposes” of the NFC, which solely con-
sist of benefits for the local people, such as general poverty
reduction, protection of environment, employment opportu-
nities and investments in infrastructure.
A counter discourse in this context, traceable in academic
debates, is the concern about sufficient remaining land for
future generations. However, only a few Tanzanian villagers
and land officers referred to this discourse in specific land-
scarce situations, but never as fundamental argument against
land deals.
4.3.4 Unequal access to knowledge about land rights
While investors have access to legal experts and can get sup-
port from the TIC in land rights issues, local communities
have usually only very limited knowledge about the land law.
It is the task of government officers to inform them about
the legal procedures and their rights, but it seems that they
did it to a varying and usually insufficient degree. Hence, in
both case studies part of the individuals and villages gave
away an important livelihood asset without being fully aware
about the consequences. In Pangani, most of the villagers, in-
cluding village leaders, were not aware that the land which
was transferred to the category general land – to be pro-
vided to TF – was not in their hands anymore, but under
the authority of the Ministry of Lands. They were convinced
that they could withdraw it from the investor whenever they
wanted. Another confusing matter was the unit of measure-
ment. While in the rural areas acre is the common unit, in-
vestors and district staff used hectare – a considerable dif-
ference of which not all villagers were aware. They also did
not know that land should be compensated based on market
values. In Kilolo, when problems arose in the case of village
land that belonged to neighbouring villagers, most local peo-
ple and their leaders did not have the necessary knowledge
on how to reclaim their rights in time. Otherwise, they would
probably not have lost the land against their will.
4.3.5 Unequal resources and alternatives
When it comes to negotiations between local landholders
and investors, the investors’ resource-based components of
bargaining power consist of the offered compensation and
labour opportunities, while the villagers’ mainly commit
their land and labour. Once land is transferred local people
have no legal means to withdraw it from the investor. Hence,
they can only contribute their labour to the proposed part-
nership, a resource that is easily replaceable, as shown in
Kilolo, where labourers moved in from other areas. Unequal
availability of alternatives to the deal further unbalance the
bargaining power of the involved stakeholders: investors, at
least in an initial stage, could go elsewhere to find suitable
land and labourers for their endeavour, whereas many local
people have restricted mobility and feel that the proposed in-
vestment is a unique opportunity to improve their livelihood
situation. Also regarding work conditions, the lack of alterna-
tives made labourers accept the conditions offered, as high-
lighted by an interviewee: “they [company’s managers] know
that even if they pay low salary you must work on their plan-
tation because that’s the only way you can get money”. The
companies thus profit from the local people’s comparatively
weak resource-based bargaining power and limited alterna-
tives to the proposed deal.
4.3.6 Local communities’ potential resistance through
threat of illegal actions
In the conflictive cases where people’s rights are contra-
vened, ultimate means of resistance remain for them, i.e. the
“weapons of the weak” (Scott, 1985, see also Wolford et al.,
2013:195): they could harm the company by destroying their
plantations. Although to our knowledge the villagers never
openly threatened to employ this means, the atmosphere was
very tense in the cases of denied land rights. It might have
been fear of arson, combined with other reasons, which ulti-
mately led the NFC to agree on an additional compensation
payment in a conflictive case. Similar motives might have
brought the TF to suspend their plantation activities in 2010
in one of the villages upon the demand of village leaders who
suspected some inconsistency in the land deal process.
4.3.7 Power differences within communities
Local communities cannot be seen as homogenous with re-
gard to their involvement in the decision-making process.
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They must be differentiated along different aspects of their
social identity and individuals’ assets such as education and
financial resources, as illustrated in the following three ex-
amples.
In Pangani, it must be assumed that not all social groups
had been represented equally in the village discussions and
decisions. In particular, women and pastoralists were re-
ported to participate less in village meetings, and could there-
fore not bring in their opinion. However, during interviews,
no complaints were mentioned in this regard. In the con-
flictive case in Kilolo, most of the landholders have lost
land against their will due to lack of awareness on how to
(re)claim their rights in time. However, a knowledgeable
businessman understood what was going on and managed
to stop the district officials from surveying his plot for the
land transfer (for details see Locher, 2011). Finally, house-
holds with a favourable combination of assets have had more
freedom of decision on whether to transfer their land and un-
der what conditions. In Kilolo, households in adverse eco-
nomic conditions, be it due to a drought or personal reasons,
rather accepted the deal, even when the compensation offered
was low. In Pangani it became clear that the poorer house-
holds among the population that depended on labour income
welcomed the investor on their village reserve land without
further questioning, while members of better-off households
rather raised issues such as the question of the quality of the
offered compensation.
5 Discussion and concluding remarks
5.1 Towards a better understanding of processes and
consequences
By analysing two forestry companies in Tanzania, we have
deliberately chosen an investment sector and also a country
with presumably more positive outcomes for local popula-
tions compared to land deals in other sectors and countries. It
became obvious that even under these preconditions, the con-
sequences for local people are ambivalent. Unequal power
relations during the negotiations led to cases of violated land
rights, inadequate compensation for the land and decreased
food security in the worst cases. Further, the Tanzanian vil-
lagers involved have given up part of their reserve land for
future generations, and have handed control of this land over
to the national government and the investors, whose future
actions are not fully predictable to them. The insights we
gained go beyond the case studies. The focus on power in
the negotiation process grasps power strands that play – of
course with different weights – an important role in all land
deals. It can be assumed that land deals under less favourable
conditions lead to worse consequences for the local commu-
nities.
Besides this overall finding, our in-depth case studies have
further contributed to a more differentiated picture of the
global land rush in three aspects: first, in line with the liveli-
hoods perspective, we have shown that local people have
agency. Many deliberately decided for or against land deals.
Under certain circumstances, namely (perceived) sufficient
land availability and a fair land deal process, they welcome
foreign investors. However, many villagers take their deci-
sions in a weak position. Some were even passed over in the
decision-making process.
Second, it is crucial to understand the detailed power
strands at play and the different bargaining positions during
the decision-making and negotiation processes. Such an anal-
ysis provides us indications for potential measures to better
equilibrate the power positions. Our analysis revealed the fol-
lowing power strands: the land law as basis for rights-based
means of access, access to influential government authorities,
legitimizing discourses, varying knowledge on land rights
and local people’s potential resistance through illegal actions.
In bargaining situations, the investors’ favourable resources,
based on financial means, and unequal availability of alter-
natives to the deal play a crucial role: as long as investors
have rather unrestricted access to land in many countries, vil-
lagers’ offered resources to the deals are comparatively easily
replaceable for the investors. Moreover, as along as rural peo-
ple experience only limited support in terms of infrastructure
and income opportunities from elsewhere, they have hardly
any alternatives to the proposed deals, which they often see
as a chance to improve their livelihoods. These factors lead to
villagers having rather weak bargaining power vis-à-vis the
investors.
Third, the bargaining power vis-à-vis investors varies for
different groups within local communities. Relevant factors
are the economic situation, education, access to knowledge,
gender, livelihood strategy and other aspects of social iden-
tity. Comparatively privileged households or individuals have
a lower risk of agreeing to a land deal under unfavourable
conditions and consequently suffering from adverse conse-
quences. On the other hand, poor members of the communi-
ties might make use of new labour opportunities more often
than wealthier people. Yet, due to the poor working condi-
tions, we assume no substantial poverty reduction from these
opportunities (see also Li, 2011). Hence, while a broad and
in-depth impact analysis is still outstanding, our results indi-
cate a tendency towards a potential fragmented development
(see Rauch, this issue).
5.2 What reactions against negative consequences of
the global land rush?
In absence of the possibility to halt the global land rush, ef-
forts should first of all be made to channel land investments
to areas with comparatively ample land availability. In prac-
tice, this is very delicate, as the division between land un-
der use and unused land is not clear cut, and many (tem-
porary or common) uses are difficult to identify (Borras Jr.
and Franco, 2010). Further, areas with ample land and with
limited land often co-exist at small scale. More importantly,
www.geogr-helv.net/69/249/2014/ Geogr. Helv., 69, 249–258, 2014
256 M. Locher and U. Müller-Böker: “Investors are good, if they follow the rules”
the availability of unused land is generally decreasing. Also
Africa, often considered as comparatively rich in unused
land, has changed from “a continent of land abundance in the
first half of the twentieth century to one of increasing land
scarcity at its end” (Berry, 2002:639). Hence, the question
of sufficient land for smallholders and future generations re-
mains a tenuous issue. Many observers advocate a complete
stop of large-scale land investments and increased support
of the rural population instead (e.g. de Schutter, 2011; Li,
2011).
Second, as long as land deals continue, an attempt to reach
more favourable outcomes requires a focus on the negoti-
ations. In this context, the important role of the host gov-
ernments must not be underestimated (Wolford et al., 2013;
Peters, 2013). The first requirement is the general recogni-
tion of any land rights, including customary rights, by the
national government (cf. Steimann and Geiser, 2012). When
it comes to land deals, the involvement of (local) landholders
as decision-makers is indispensable. This requires not only
respective land laws and financial means to implement them
but also political will and a respective attitude of government
officials on all levels (Knight, 2010), in short, good gover-
nance. Then, a careful and impartial analysis of local land
uses and rights, including those of pastoralists, women and
other potentially vulnerable groups, should be a precondi-
tion for any land investment. Participatory land use planning
at the village level, as foreseen in Tanzania, would be a po-
tentially helpful tool in this regard, if it were implemented
before any investors express their interest for the respective
area. Further, the power positions during the negotiations
must be better balanced in favour of the local populations,
by providing them in-depth knowledge on their land rights
and on potential risks of the land deals (e.g. through train-
ings conducted by NGOs beforehand or by lawyers that sup-
port the villagers during the process). Finally, the sometimes
inconsiderate legitimation of land deals by the government
based on development discourses needs to give way to a more
critical picture of land investments that also sheds light on
their multiple risks.
The following international initiatives address some of
the above-mentioned concerns: the Principles for Responsi-
ble Agricultural Investment that Respects Rights, Livelihoods
and Resources (FAO et al., 2010; in short: RAI principles) by
the World Bank Group and three UN agencies address in-
vestors and host countries. The RAI principles are voluntary,
and the scope of their effects is questioned (Borras Jr. and
Franco, 2010; Locher et al., 2012). The Voluntary Guidelines
on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries
and Forests in the Context of National Food Security (FAO,
2012) have been developed in a participatory process involv-
ing FAO member countries, international organizations, the
private sector and civil society. They address mainly potential
host states. The guidelines provide a valuable basis, but need
to be translated into concrete, effective instruments, adapted
to the diverse national settings. However, good governance –
the basis to implement any of these measures – remains an
issue in most of the targeted countries.
Also some host countries have become more active in
better regulating land deals. In Tanzania it seems that the
government is currently gaining a more nuanced picture on
land deals based on recent experiences with a large number
of foreign investors. Thus, the land deals might lose their
as of yet nearly unconditional legitimation by the govern-
ment. The announced plans to limit the land size of individ-
ual deals and encourage out-grower models instead of large-
scale plantations point in this direction. There are also hints
about a land for equity model to be encouraged in the future,
where local people would not transfer their land to the in-
vestors, but allocate it to them for a certain period and gain
shares of the companies’ profit (Kiishweko, 2012; interview
with TIC official by Locher, 2013). The possibility to with-
draw land from investors would considerably strengthen the
villagers’ resource-based bargaining power. However, out-
comes of such arrangements would still depend on many
other power strands and would need to be scrutinized once
implemented.
Finally, national policies of the investors’ countries of ori-
gin need to be strengthened. An example is provided from
Switzerland: a campaign of around 50 Swiss civil society or-
ganizations demands to make transnational land investments
of Switzerland-based companies adhere to Swiss regulations
(Recht ohne Grenzen, 2013).
5.3 Outlook
The global institutions influencing the global land rush – es-
pecially the financial market – are hardly comprehensible;
thus scenarios about the future effects of this phenomenon on
rural development in the global South remain partially spec-
ulative. There are hints about a slow down of foreign invest-
ments in some areas, e.g. in the biofuel sector of Tanzania
(Hultman et al., 2012). A tendency away from land deals to-
wards integration of smallholders in the global economy by
contract-farming arrangements – as seems to be the case in
Tanzania – is one scenario (Hall, 2011). However, the related
developments and effects on rural populations must be again
critically observed (see contribution by Franz in this issue).
As we have outlined, the effects of land deals differ consid-
erably depending on the context and people’s varying room
for manoeuvre. Considerable positive outcomes are only to
be expected under a bundle of conditions, which in practice
are rarely met. The growing awareness of the phenomenon
among academics and civil society organizations has led to
a public outcry, which might eventually have effects on in-
ternational and national policies and politics and companies’
scope of action, but may also fade away unheard. On any ac-
count, one point is clear: the challenges for rural poor to cope
with consequences of global actions at grassroots levels are
enormous. Thus, the global land rush, as it is occurring so far,
provides severe risks for the livelihoods of rural populations.
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